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THE PACE AND CAUSE OF CHANGE
LARRY

D. KRAMER*

Lawyers hate change. That's a generalization, of course, and
there are plenty of situations in which lawyers have not only
embraced change but led the charge. Still, legal training nurtures
a predisposition to preserve the familiar, while providing assorted
tools with which to do so. Packaged attractively in the adage
about putting new wine in old bottles, the most common
manifestation of this lawyerly disability is our reluctance to shed
doctrines that long ago outgrew the conditions that called them
into existence. Rather than accept and abandon, we invent new
rationales and look for new justifications to retain forms that have
become comfortable.
If the treatment of Marbury v. Madison is any evidence, legal
historians suffer this same disability.
For having finally,
thoroughly, and with little room left for disagreement, demolished
the myth that Marbury was important in creating judicial review,
historians of the case seem unable to stop searching for other
reasons to celebrate Marshall's opinion-unwilling, it seems, to
drop from the canon of constitutional law a decision that was for so
many years its centerpiece.
The work of my colleague William Nelson is a case in point.
Among the most notable and influential scholars in undoing the
myth of Marbury and judicial review,' Nelson still finds himself
drawn irresistibly into the hunt for new ways to say that the case
was a landmark. In a recent book, Nelson argued that Marbury
was important because it "took [the Court] out of politics."' Here,
he argues for additional significance by suggesting that Marbury's
doctrine of judicial review somehow furthered or operated in
conjunction with a successful Federalist campaign to "seize from
juries the power to find law."'
Russell D. Niles Professor of Law, New York University School
of Law.
Portions of this article are adapted from chapters four through six of LARRY D.
KRAMER, THE PEOPLE THEMSELVES: POPULAR CONSTITUTIONALISM AND
JUDICIAL REVIEW (forthcoming 2004).
1. See WILLIAM E. NELSON, MARBURY V. MADISON: THE ORIGINS AND
LEGACY OF JUDICIAL REVIEW 1-53 (2000) [hereinafter NELSON, MARBURY];

William E. Nelson, The Eighteenth-Century Background of John Marshall's
ConstitutionalJurisprudence,76 MICH. L. REV. 893 (1978).
2. NELSON, MARBURY, supra note 1, at 71.
3. William E. Nelson, The Province of the Judiciary, 37 J. MARSHALL L.
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There is something striking about juxtaposing the separation
of courts from politics and the stripping from juries of power to
find law, which legal scholars have seldom linked or treated as
closely associated. They are, we can immediately see, intimately
related: two parts of a single development that might be described
as "the legalization of the judiciary." Putting it this way probably
sounds peculiar to modern lawyers, who are accustomed to
thinking of courts and legality as overlapping if not indeed
identical categories. But the relationship of law to politics, and of
both to the different branches of government, was less clear and
less settled in the eighteenth century.4 Creating the modern
judicial function-which assigns courts control over the
interpretation and application of positive law-called for
significant adjustments in what judges were accustomed to doing
in colonial and Revolutionary America. They had to give up some
things while assuming greater responsibility for others.
What judges had to give up was their role as active partisans.
Commentators today often accuse judges of being political,
meaning either that political preferences influence decisions or,
more strongly, that judicial opinions mask political preferences in
legal forms. But that sort of stuff pales in comparison to the
activities of judges in the Early Republic, whose politics were
neither hidden nor subtle. Even before Congress enacted the
Sedition Act, for example, Federalist judges tried independently to
muzzle their Republican opponents by actively instituting common
law sedition actions against newspaper editors who criticized
Adams administration policies.5 Some continued to do so even
after the Federalists had been routed in the election of 1800.6
Many of the same judges freely used their office to promote a
nakedly partisan agenda, haranguing juries in blatantly political
charges delivered with an eye to broader circulation in the press.
Justice Samuel Chase used his charge to a grand jury in Maryland
to urge jurors (and others) to vote against Republicans in the next
REV. 317, 317 (2004).
4. See Christine A. Desan, The Constitutional Commitment to Legislative
Adjudication in the EarlyAmerican Tradition, 111 HARV. L. REV. 1381 (1998).
5. STEPHEN B. PRESSER, THE ORIGINAL MISUNDERSTANDING: THE
ENGLISH,
THE AMERICANS,
AND
THE DIALECTIC
OF FEDERALIST
JURISPRUDENCE 96 (1991).
6. Not long after the election, Federalist judges in the new District of
Columbia circuit court instituted a common law libel prosecution against the
editor of the Republican NationalIntelligencer. The matter was dropped when
the Grand Jury refused to indict and the District Attorney declined to
prosecute, but Republicans saw the incident as evidence of how Federalists
planned to use their hold on the judiciary, and it helped spur the successful
effort to abolish the new courts in 1802. See 1 CHARLES WARREN, THE
SUPREME COURT IN UNITED STATES HISTORY 194-98 (Fred B. Rothman & Co.
1987) (1922); RICHARD E. ELLIS, THE JEFFERSONIAN CRISIS: COURTS AND
POLITICS IN THE YOUNG REPUBLIC 40 (1971).
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election, simultaneously denouncing universal suffrage and other
proposed changes
in state law as dangerous steps toward
"mobocracy."7 It was the abandonment of this kind of unapologetic
partisan activity that presumably lies behind Nelson's claim that
Marshall used the opinion in Marbury to draw "a line between law
and politics."8 In so doing, Nelson suggests, Marshall and the
Court effectively struck a bargain with the political branches: we
stop using our office to influence partisan conflicts and advance
administration policy, you leave the interpretation and application
of law to us.
But fashioning the modern judiciary entailed more than
getting judges to cease openly using the bench as a platform for
explicitly partisan ends. It also required finding a way to give
judges more control over the law. In the context of eighteenthcentury America, this meant first and foremost taking that control
away from juries, which (as Nelson has shown elsewhere) 'had
vast power to find both the law and the facts" in nearly every
case.9 Hence, the other half of what Nelson portrays as Marshall's
effort to redefine the judicial function entailed successfully
creating and establishing the modern adjudicatory process-in
which juries find facts and judges find law, and in which a jury
that ignores the judge's instructions is (in civil cases, at least)
subject to direct judicial control.
That both these developments occurred is incontrovertible.
That Marbury had much to do with either of them is more
doubtful.
I.

MARBURY AND THE SEPARATION OF LAW AND POLITICS

In his book about Marbury v. Madison, Nelson portrays
Marshall and his brethren as striving courageously to
"distinguish[] between the domain of law and the domain of
politics." ° The Justices refused to be drawn into making the Court
a tool for advancing Federalist political goals, on the one hand, he
says, while simultaneously making clear that the Court would
protect the law and the Constitution, on the other. Marshall did
this, Nelson claims, by distinguishing in his opinion "between
political matters, to be resolved by the legislative and executive
branches in the new democratic, majoritarian style, and legal
matters, to be resolved by the judiciary in the government-byconsensus style that had prevailed in most eighteenth-century

7. 2 SAMUEL SMITH, TRIAL OF SAMUEL CHASE, AN ASSOCIATE JUSTICE OF
THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES vi (Da Capo Press 1970) (1805).
8. NELSON, MARBURY, supra note 1, at 60.
9. WILLIAM E. NELSON, AMERICANIZATION OF THE COMMON LAW 21 (1975)
[hereinafter NELSON, AMERICANIZATION]
10. NELSON, MARBURY, supra note 1, at 59.
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American courts.""
There is a technical sense in which Nelson is indubitably
correct. The Marbury Court did say that it could do some things
and that it could not do others, and it explained the difference in
terms of a line between law and politics. Marshall thus observed,
in an oft-quoted passage that Nelson also emphasizes, that
whether Jefferson's act of not delivering Marbury's commission
was "examinable in a court of justice" depended on "the nature of
that act":
By the constitution of the United States, the President is invested
with certain important political powers, in the exercise of which he
is to use his own discretion, and is accountable only to his country in
his political character, and to his own conscience.... The subjects
are political. They respect the nation, not individual rights, and
being entrusted to the executive, the decision of the executive is
conclusive....
But when the legislature proceeds to impose on [an executive] officer
other duties; when he is directed peremptorily to perform certain
acts; when the rights of individuals are dependent on the
performance of those acts; he is so far the officer of the law; is
amenable to the laws for his conduct; and cannot at his discretion
sport away the vested rights of others."
That sounds very nice, but what does it actually say? What
kind of "distinction" was Marshall making? Commentators have
long puzzled over the meaning of this language, their confusion
compounded by Marshall's oracular elaboration and examples.
"The application of this remark[,]" he explained, "will be perceived
by adverting to the act of congress for establishing the department
of foreign affairs." 3 Insofar as that act provided for the Secretary
of State "to conform precisely to the will of the President[,]" the
Secretary is "the mere organ by whom that [presidential] will is
communicated" and his acts "can never be examined by the
courts." 4 Or again, "where the heads of departments are the
political or confidential agents of the executive, merely to execute
the will of the President, or rather to act in cases in which the
executive possesses a constitutional or legal discretion, nothing
can be more perfectly clear than that their acts are only politically
examinable."" Or yet again, this time a more specific example:
"The power of nominating to the senate, and the power of
appointing the person nominated, are political powers, to be

11. Id.
12. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 165-66 (1803), quoted in
part in NELSON, MARBURY, supra note 1, at 61.
13. Marbury, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) at 166.
14. Id.
15. Id.

2004]

The Pace and Cause of Change

exercised by the President according to his own discretion.""6
Without purporting to resolve the many obscurities in these
passages, two points are, I think, apparent. First, on its face, the
"line" Marshall drew between law and politics did little to limit the
Court's power. An act was "only politically examinable" if it was
something as to which the "executive possesse[d] a constitutional
or legal discretion"-that is, if it was something not governed by
positive law. But who was to decide that? The courts, of course.
There were, to be sure, cases that would be easy and obvious. A
statute or the Constitution might make clear that a particular act
was within an executive officer's discretion, as with Marshall's
example of the President's appointment power. But apart from
these relatively rare situations, the fact that the president's acts
could not be examined if he possessed "a constitutional or legal
discretion" amounted to little so long as courts got to say whether
or not he did. And Marshall was decidedly opaque and noncommittal in explaining how such determinations were to be
made.' 7
Second, to the extent the Court was announcing a principle of
restraint or limitation, it was a trivial one, concerning only
matters as to which there had never been any controversy.
Consider again Marshall's examples: No judge had ever been
asked to order the president to nominate someone or to require the
Secretary of State to engage or not engage in something like treaty
negotiations. This is because, while the line between law and
politics may have been murky, there was nevertheless a line, even
then. And nothing Marshall said about defining that line in
Marbury was either new or especially significant.
The kind of judicial involvement in politics that was
controversial-the kind that actually mattered at the time-was of
a different order altogether. It consisted of judges using their
office for explicitly partisan purposes, with an eye toward
influencing electoral politics.'8 And viewed from that perspective,
Marbury was as nakedly "political" as anything that preceded it,
tempered only by the fact that the Republicans were now in office
and, if pushed too far, could be counted on to retaliate. In its
original context, in other words, Marbury was anything but a
16. Id. at 167.
17. The "political question" doctrine that subsequently developed was, in
fact, very broad: much broader than its anemic descendant today. See 1
JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES
346-47 (Carolina Academic Press 1987) (1833).

It would be a mistake, however, to assume that this broad
understanding of political questions was already immanent in Marshall's
opinion in Marbury. Struggle over the scope of judicial power was constant
throughout the early decades of the nineteenth century, resulting in a
continual process of redefinition and refinement.
18. See supra notes 5-7 and accompanying text.
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retreat or a withdrawal from politics. It was an overt Federalist
counterpunch aimed at the Jefferson Administration: a weak
counterpunch, to be sure, but the best the politically astute
Marshall could manage under the circumstances.
Certainly this is how it was received at the time. No one paid
much attention to the Court's exercise of judicial review, which
Marshall framed modestly in terms that even his critics
endorsed.19 What attracted notice when Marbury was decided was
Marshall's discussion of how Adams's signature completed the
appointment and entitled Marbury to have the commission
delivered-an aspect of the opinion Nelson brushes past as "a
narrow and technical ruling."" This was not actually a "ruling," of
course, given the Court's conclusion that it lacked subject matter
jurisdiction.
It was, rather, an elaborate dictum, included
contrary to good judicial practice for the sole purpose of publicly
scolding the Jefferson Administration.
This aspect of Marshall's opinion "received widespread
comment" at the time.21
Jefferson was furious, perceiving
Marshall's legally superfluous lecture as a politically motivated
attack on his presidency. "The case of Marbury v. Madison has
been cited," Jefferson was still seething four years later, "and I
think it material to stop at the threshold the citing [of] that case
as authority, and to have it denied to be law."22 Urging that
Marshall's opinion was both "extrajudicial, and as such of no
authority" and "against law," Jefferson disclosed that he had "long
wished for a proper occasion to have the gratuitous opinion in
Marbury v. Madison brought before the public, and denounced as
not law." 2 Fifteen more years passed and Jefferson was still vexed
by the way Marshall had played politics with the case, irritably
telling William Johnson that what Marshall had done in Marbury
was "very irregular and very censurable" and should be
condemned as a "perversion of law." 4
Nor was Jefferson alone in reading Marbury as an overtly
political decision. Federalists celebrated the opinion for justly
censuring what they regarded as a wicked administration.
"Constitution violated by the President," the New York Evening
Post proclaimed triumphantly in an editorial published shortly
19. Larry Kramer, Marbury and the Retreat From Judicial Supremacy, 20
CONST. COMMENT. (forthcoming 2003).
20. NELSON, MARBURY, supra note 1, at 60.
21. 1 WARREN, supra note 6, at 245.

22. Letter from Thomas Jefferson to George Hay (June 2, 1807), in 4
MEMOIRS, CORRESPONDENCE, AND PRIVATE PAPERS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 76

(Thomas Randolph Jefferson ed., 1829).
23. Id. at 76-77.
24. Letter from Thomas Jefferson to William Johnson (June 12, 1823), in 10
THE WRITINGS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 1816-1826, at 226, 230 (Paul Leicester

Ford ed., 1899).
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after the decision.25 "What falsehood! What mockery! What
insolence!," the indignant editorialist cried.26 "Behold a subtle and
smooth-faced hypocrisy concealing an ambition the most criminal,
the most enormous, the most unprincipled."27 The Washington
Federalist likewise read Marshall's opinion as condemning the
Republican administration and its supporters. "Let such men read
this opinion and blush," the paper's editors solemnly intoned, "if
the power of blushing still remains with them. It will remain as a
monument of the wisdom, impartiality and independence of the
Supreme Court, long after the names of its petty revilers shall
have sunk into oblivion." 8 Other Federalist papers said much the
same, finding in Marbury welcome relief from the relentless
political beating they were otherwise taking at the hands of
Jefferson and his followers.
Republicans were quieter on their side, a product no doubt of
confidence in their popular support and their firm control of
affairs.
They were not silent, however, and they "bitterly
resented" the action of Marshall and the Court in issuing this
One
singularly inappropriate and uncalled for reprimand.29
to Boston's Independent Chronicle wrote
correspondent
sardonically, "I take it for granted that the Supreme Court of the
Nation would not, from party motives, volunteer an extra-judicial
opinion for the sake of criminating a rival department of
government; and yet, in all my reading, I have not been able to
find either principle or precedent for such a practice. ' Others
were more forthright about rebuking Marshall and the other
Justices for their decidedly non-judicial behavior.31 "Littleton"
wrote in the Virginia Argus that the decision "perplexes as much
as it astonishes the thinking mind" and insisted that good lawyers
viewed Marbury as "a hideous monster."2
To understand why it was so apparent to everyone at the time
that Marshall had produced a piece of political propaganda, we
need briefly to recall the history and context of the case. Having
lost control of both the executive and legislative branches in the
election of 1800, lame duck Federalists in Congress acted quickly
to secure supporters a sanctuary in the judiciary. Their last
months in office thus witnessed a flurry of legislative activity
designed to restructure the third branch." The main feature of the
25. See 1 WARREN, supra note 6, at 247.
26. Id. at 248.
27. Id.
28. Id. at 246.
29. Id. at 244.
30. Id. at 252.
31. Id. at 248-55.
32. 1 WARREN, supra note 6, at 249-50.
33. Dean Alfange, Jr., Marbury v. Madison and Original Understandingsof
Judicial Review: In Defense of Traditional Wisdom, 1993 SUP. CT. REV. 329,
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Judiciary Act of 1801 consisted of relieving the Supreme Court
Justices of circuit-riding duties by creating six new circuit courts
staffed by sixteen new judges; the Supreme Court was at the same
time reduced in size from six to five beginning with the next
vacancy.34 Additional legislation, enacted just four days before
Jefferson's inauguration, created yet another circuit court with
three more judges in the District of Columbia, while also
authorizing the President to nominate as many justices of the
peace as he deemed "expedient."35 By this none-too-subtle means,
the Federalists rewarded themselves with numerous appointments
to the inferior courts-not just the judges, but also the marshals,
clerks, federal attorneys, and other supporting personnel attached
to a court-while simultaneously requiring the incoming
Republican Administration to wait for two vacancies on the
Supreme Court before it could make its first appointment there.
Republicans were furious, and many in the party urged the
new president to act immediately to undo this eleventh-hour
legislative outrage. But Jefferson was not anxious to begin his
term in office by plunging into what promised to be a bitter
partisan affair. He and most of his supporters were prepared to
live and let live if the newly appointed officeholders would act
honorably and responsibly."6 Jefferson went out of his way to be
conciliatory in his inaugural address, and he pursued (at some
considerable political cost) a restrained policy with respect to
patronage.
Of relevance to Marbury, for example, Jefferson
reduced the number of justices of the peace in the District of
Columbia from the forty-two created by Adams to just thirty, but
he included
twenty-five of Adams's original appointees in this
37
group.
Then, in December 1801, Secretary of State James Madison
was served with notice that a motion would be made in the
Supreme Court asking Madison to show cause why a writ of
mandamus should not be issued directing him to deliver
commissions as justices of the peace to William Marbury and three
other disappointed candidates. Madison ignored the summons,
and Chief Justice Marshall granted the motion to show cause,
351-52; Kathryn Turner, FederalistPolicy and the Judiciary Act of 1801, 22
WM. & MARY Q. 3, 15-21 (1965).
34. Judiciary Act of 1801, ch. 4, §§ 3, 6-7, 2 Stat. 89-90.
35. Act of Feb. 27, 1801, ch. 15, §§ 3, 11, 2 Stat. 105, 107.
36. 1 WARREN, supra note 6, at 204; ELLIS, supra note 6, at 34-35, 41-43;
Alfange, supra note 33, at 355-56.
37. See DUMAS MALONE, JEFFERSON THE PRESIDENT: FIRST TERM, 18011805, at 17-28, 69-89, 144 (1970). A recent article on William Marbury
appears to suggest that this number may have been lower, perhaps twentytwo. See David F. Forte, Marbury's Travail: FederalistPolitics and William
Marbury's Appointment as Justice of the Peace, 45 CATH. U. L. REV. 349, 40002 & n.271 (1996).
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setting the case for argument the following term. Republicans
were indignant, interpreting the Court's show cause order as
confirmation of how Federalists planned to use the judiciary to
obstruct Jefferson's administration. Indeed, filing Marbury turned
out to be the crucial act that united Republicans behind the repeal
effort. "The conduct of the Judges on this occasion," Virginia
Senator Stevens Thomas Mason told Madison, "has excited a very
general indignation and will secure the repeal of the Judiciary
Law of the last session about the propriety of which some of our
Republican friends were hesitating."'
The repeal debate proved to be every bit as ugly and
contentious as moderate Republicans had feared. Both sides
referred to the pending Marbury case-Republicans offering it as
evidence of judicial overreaching, Federalists citing it as an
example of why an independent judiciary was necessary." But the
Republicans controlled both houses of Congress and were, in
addition, supported by the public. Hence, in the end, which came
on March 3, 1802, the Act was of course repealed.4"
A small coterie of ultra-Federalists--Jefferson called them
"the bitterest cup of the remains of Federalism rendered desperate
and furious by despair" 1-would not accept defeat and embarked
on a campaign to sabotage the Republicans' victory.
They
formulated a three-pronged attack. First, they sought to drum up
public support by circulating a pamphlet entitled The Solemn
Protest of the Honorable Judge Bassett. Written by the father-inlaw of Federalist stalwart James Bayard (who tried to talk him
out of it), Judge Bassett claimed to speak for all the removed
judges in rehashing the arguments made against repeal and
calling upon the Supreme Court to declare the repeal act
unconstitutional. Second, eleven of the removed circuit judges
petitioned Congress for a redress of grievances, hoping in this way
to revive divisions in the Republicans' ranks.42 Finally, a number
of test cases were brought challenging the repeal act in the
restored federal circuit courts.

38. See ELLIS, supra note 6, at 44 (quoting Letter from Stevens Thomas
Mason to James Madison (Dec. 21, 1801)).
39. See, e.g., speech by James A. Bayard, in 11 ANNALS OF CONG. 614-15
(1802); speech by John Randolph, in id. at 661-62; speech by Samuel W. Dana,
in id. at 903-06.
40. The Senate had voted for repeal a month earlier by the uncomfortably
close margin of a single vote-a byproduct of the fact that only a third of the

Senate turned over in any given election. Also following party lines, the
House vote more accurately reflected the Republicans' control of Congress and
was 59-32. Id. at 982.
41. Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Joel Barlow (May 3, 1802), in 8 THE
WRITINGS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON, supra note 24, at 148-49.
42. See Linda K. Kerber, Oliver Wolcott: Midnight Judge, 3" CONN. HIST.
Soc'y BULLETIN 25, 29 (1967).
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Nothing came of these efforts. The public relations campaign
failed, owing partly to the ham-fisted and insulting manner in
which the Federalists presented their case, but even more to the
fact that the repeal was genuinely popular.'
The results in
Congress were still more disheartening. Republicans in the House
of Representatives turned down the judges' request without
dissension on the very day it was filed; the Senate took somewhat
longer but reached the same result on a party-line vote. But the
most crushing blow came when the Federalists' various court
actions challenging repeal were summarily rejected in the circuit
courts.
Anticipating the possibility of such challenges, the Republican
Congress had already passed legislation designed to put off a
ruling from the Supreme Court. This was accomplished by
legislation adopted in early April that abolished the Supreme
Court's June and December terms, thus delaying the Court's next
sitting until February 1803, by which time Jefferson hoped that
tempers in the capital would have cooled." An incidental effect of
this legislation was to put off the hearing in Marbury v. Madison,
which otherwise would have been heard in June.
Undeterred, some of the diehard Federalists challenged the
constitutionality of repeal in four lower court cases. They argued,
first, that Congress had no power to order the transfer of actions
already pending in courts established under the Judiciary Act of
1801. Second, they said it was unconstitutional for Supreme Court
Justices also to sit as judges in the circuit courts. But mainly they
argued that Congress had no power to remove judges who were
guilty of no malfeasance or dereliction in office. In three of these
challenges-presided over by Justices Washington and Cushing
and by Chief Justice Marshall-their arguments were rejected on
the spot. 45
In the fourth, heard by Justice Paterson, the
proceedings were adjourned overnight, leaving time for
conversations that led a "very much mortified" Theophilus Parsons
to withdraw his plea the next morning.46
Though four of six Supreme Court Justices had now indicated
their unwillingness to rule against the Republican administration,
the Federalists pressed on by appealing Chief Justice Marshall's
ruling to the full Court. The argument and decision in the case,

43. On the popularity of repeal, see 2 GEORGE LEE HASKINS & HERBERT A.
JOHNSON, THE OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES DEVISE HISTORY OF THE SUPREME
COURT: FOUNDATIONS OF POWER: JOHN MARSHALL, 1801-1815, at 156-63

(1981).
44. ELLIS, supra note 6, at 58-59.
45. See id. at 62-63; JEAN EDWARD SMITH, JOHN MARSHALL: DEFINER OF A
NATION 310-11 (1996).
46. ELLIS, supra note 6, at 63 (The quote is from a letter by Levi Lincoln to
Jefferson).
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captioned Stuart v. Laird, trailed those in Marbury by a few days
each. Predictably, given what they had already said and done, the
Justices affirmed the lower court. Justice Paterson's opinion for a
unanimous Court was brief and not fully to the point. It was clear
that Congress could abolish the inferior courts set up in the
Judiciary Act of 1801 and transfer their cases to a different
tribunal, the Court said, there being "no words in the constitution
to prohibit or restrain" Congress's authority to "establish from
time to time such inferior tribunals as they may think proper."47
As for the objection that Supreme Court Justices could not sit on
circuit courts, "it is sufficient to observe, that practice and
acquiescence under it for a period of several years, commencing
with the organization of the judicial system, affords an irresistible
answer, and has indeed fixed the construction.... [Tihe question
is at rest, and ought not to be disturbed."" Remarkably, Paterson
and the Court ignored the appellant's most fundamental objection,
which was that Congress could not remove Article III judges by
any means other than impeachment or for any reasons other than
misbehavior in office. But that argument was no longer essential
to decide the case once the Court had concluded that Congress
could transfer pending actions from one court to another, and the
Justices chose in Stuart to say no more than was absolutely
necessary to decide the case before them.
We are now, finally, in a position to understand the manysided calculation that lay behind Chief Justice Marshall's
enigmatic opinion in Marbury. Like every Federalist, Marshall
worried about how far Republicans would go to dismantle the
political order established under the leadership of Washington and
Hamilton. Bear in mind that disagreements between the parties
were not confined to questions of policy, but reflected profoundly
different social philosophies.49 A major organizing principle of
Federalism was fear of populism and demagoguery. In its most
extreme manifestations, Federalism exhibited open contempt for
ordinary citizens and a sure conviction that republicanism would
fail unless such citizens left problems of governing to their social
and intellectual betters. Gouverneur Morris perfectly expressed
47. Stuart v. Laird, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 299, 309 (1803).
48. Id.
49. See LINDA K KERBER, FEDERALISTS IN DISSENT: IMAGERY AND
IDEOLOGY IN JEFFERSONIAN AMERICA (1980); JAMES M. BANNER, JR., To THE
HARTFORD CONVENTION: THE FEDERALISTS AND THE ORIGINS OF PARTY
POLITICS IN MASSACHUSETTS, 1789-1815 (1970); DAVID HACKETT FISCHER,
THE REVOLUTION OF AMERICAN CONSERVATISM: THE FEDERALIST PARTY IN
THE ERA OF JEFFERSONIAN DEMOCRACY 1-49 (1965); David Waldstreicher,
Federalism, the Style of Politics, and the Politics of Style, in FEDERALISTS
RECONSIDERED 99 (Doron Ben-Atar & Barbara B. Oberg eds., 1998). On
Republican interpretations and reactions, see DREW R. MCCOY, THE ELUSIVE
REPUBLIC: POLITICAL ECONOMY IN JEFFERSONIAN AMERICA (1980).
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this tenet during the debate over repeal: "Look into the records of
time, see what has been the ruin of every Republic. The vile love*
of popularity. Why are we here? To save the people from their
most dangerous enemy; to save them from themselves."" Marshall
himself seldom spoke this bluntly, and he was generally moderate
when it came to particular policies. But he shared with all
Federalists these core convictions as well as the belief that
Jefferson and the Republicans pandered too much to popular
opinion.
Marshall was, at the same time, reasonably certain that any
attempt by the Court to stand in Jefferson's way would be crushed.
What doubts he may have harbored in this respect, moreover,
were presumably laid to rest when, just before the Court
reconvened in February, Jefferson asked the House of
Representatives to look into whether New Hampshire District
Judge John Pickering's erratic behavior warranted impeachment.5"
There was, as a result, a new "overhanging threat" to unsettle the
Justices as they sat down to decide Stuart and Marbury."
Of the two cases, Stuart v. Laird represented the greater
dilemma and more intractable problem, for the repeal act
challenged more fundamental constitutional values and reflected a
much greater threat to judicial independence than the
administration's failure to deliver some commissions in the
circumstances of Marbury's case.
Plus, Federalists and
Republicans alike cared far more about the fate of Jefferson's
repeal than they did about Marbury, and they were watching
closely to see what the Supreme Court would do-which is why
there was never really any question that the Court would do
nothing. As Dean Alfange explains:
Stuart v. Laird was manifestly not an example of nonpartisan
fairness, but of craven unwillingness on the part of the Court even
to admit the existence of the principal constitutional issue presented
by the case. The Court refused to consider this constitutional
question even though the author of its opinion had earlier
categorically written that he believed the law to be invalid for
precisely the reasons that he here chose not even to mention. The
Court acted out of a fully justified fear of the political consequences
of doing otherwise, not out of an overriding compulsion to reach the
correct legal result at whatever sacrifice of their own political
preferences.

50. 11 ANNALS OF CONG., supra note 39, at 41.

51. Jefferson's message, dated February 3, 1803, was received by the House
of Representatives on February 4, just prior to the commencement of the
Court's long-delayed term.

See 7 ANNALS OF CONG. 460 (1803); MALONE,

supra note 39, at 147-48.
52. Alfange, supra note 33, at 364-65.
53. Id. at 363-64.
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As much as the Court may have wanted to say something that
signaled its opposition to what the Republicans had done and were
doing, it was abundantly clear that anything less than total
submission to the repeal act would be suicidal.
Effectively silenced in Stuart, Marbury became the Court's
only outlet for making a statement. Yet the prospects for getting
away with something here were scarcely more promising than in
Stuart. Secretary of State Madison had ignored the initial motion
to show cause, and he displayed the same disregard for the Court's
proceedings on whether to grant the petitioners' request-not
bothering to appear or even to offer an argument. It was
abundantly clear that an order directing Madison to deliver the
commissions would likewise be ignored. Unwilling to say that
Jefferson was right, but also not wanting to have its impotence
openly put on display, the Court decided instead to dismiss for
lack of jurisdiction.
Yet Marshall could not bring himself simply to rule that
Marbury and his co-petitioners were entitled to no relief. This
would have meant letting Jefferson completely off the hook in both
cases, and that was to concede too much to the Republicans.
Marshall deemed it imperative to make some kind of statement.
Marshall therefore prefaced his jurisdictional ruling with a
lengthy dissertation explaining why the administration had acted
unlawfully by withholding the petitioners' commissions.
By
coupling this essay with a dismissal for want of jurisdiction,
Marshall was, in effect, leaving open the question whether the
Court would stand up to the executive. He was also, as one
biographer has put it, "throwing a sop to the High Federalists,"
offering something to take the edge off their disappointment.54
It was a risky strategy. As we have seen, Marshall's lecture
infuriated Jefferson and the Republicans. And not just because,
having already decided that the Court lacked jurisdiction,
Marshall's discussion was gratuitous and wholly improper (which
it was). But also because, in Jefferson's eyes, Marshall was so
obviously wrong on the merits (which he was)."
Marshall
nevertheless decided to gamble. Richard Ellis explains:
54. Smith, supranote 43, at 319.
55. Among other things, Marshall assumed without explanation that
justices of the peace were not removable at will by the executive, contrary to
the rule established in 1789. He also held that the petitioners acquired a
property right in their office once their commissions were signed by the

President, whereas most legal historians agree with Jefferson that delivery
was essential to make the commissions valid. See UNITED STATES SENATE,
THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: ANALYSIS AND

INTERPRETATION 454 (Edward S. Corwin ed., 1953) (Jefferson's "isprobably
the correct doctrine"); MALONE, supra note 37, at 144 ("But for the distortions
of partisan politics [Jefferson's] supposition would probably have been
generally accepted at the time as natural and reasonable").
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[T]he Chief Justice was an experienced politician, and he probably
realized that Jefferson, preoccupied as he was with the diplomatic
intricacies of the Louisiana Purchase and with the clashing
interests within the Republican party, was not likely to get into a
fight over a lecture that had no practical meaning. 6
Marshall's gamble paid off, and he succeeded in rebuking
Jefferson without eliciting from Republicans more than strongly
worded condemnations in the press.5 7
Against this background, it seems implausible to describe
Marbury as a case in which the Court decreed its withdrawal or
separation from politics. Marshall's opinion may contain some
language concerning a law/politics distinction, but if Marbury has
come to stand for the impropriety of judicial involvement in
politics,58 that is wholly a product of what subsequent courts and
scholars have made of the case by ignoring its actual history-a
mistake very much like the similarly misconceived tendency to
treat Marbury as an important source of judicial review. This is
not to say that Marshall may not have favored a separation
between law and politics; nor is it to deny that he may have
worked to achieve such a separation during his tenure on the
bench. It is only to say that Marbury was not one of the places
where this work was done.
Keith Whittington has argued, persuasively in my view, that
the pivotal event reshaping the role of judges in politics was the
failed effort to impeach Justice Samuel Chase.59 Conventional
wisdom long treated Chase's impeachment as part of a larger
campaign by Jefferson and the Republicans to subordinate the
judiciary to Congress.
Whittington argues that most
Republicans-and in particular the moderates who held the
balance of power in Congress-had something less radical in mind.
They objected to what they saw as the Federalists' aggressive
politicization of the courts, identifying Justice Chase as the most
extreme and uncompromising culprit. Rather than seeking to
make judges pawns of the legislature, they wanted only to
depoliticize the bench by "its institutional removal from partisan
conflicts and its disentanglement from administration politics. " "
The decision of the House to impeach was a "signal to the
judiciary ...that partisanship in the conduct of... official duties
56. ELLIS, supra note 6, at 67.
57. See MALONE, supra note 37, at 151; SMITH, supra note 43, at 325.
58. See ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, FEDERAL JURISDICTION 144 (4th ed. 2003);

Richard H. Fallon, Marbury and the Constitutional Mind: A Bicentennial
Essay on the Wages of DoctrinalTension, 91 CAL. L. REV. 1, 28-29 (2003). This
idea is itself quite old.
See MAURICE FINKELSTEIN, CASES ON
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 88 (1927).
59. KEITH E. WHITTINGTON, CONSTITUTIONAL CONSTRUCTION: DIVIDED
POWER AND CONSTITUTIONAL MEANING 20-71 (1999).

60. Id. at 49.
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would not be tolerated,"6 and the eventual decision of Republican
moderates in the Senate to acquit reflected a kind of implicit
bargain: "Good Behaviour" was redefined to mean refraining from
openly
partisan
or political
activities,
while "judicial
independence" was redefined to mean safety from impeachment
for judges who respected the new norm (and did not otherwise
commit serious crimes or malfeasances). Taking the hint, "federal
judges rapidly and obviously moved to a more neutral position
relative to 'political' conflicts."62
What Whittington calls the resulting "constitutional
construction" of the judicial role has proved impressively
durable-making it possible (among other things) to begin for the
first time thinking seriously about the more refined kind of line
between law and politics that Nelson apparently has in mind.
Certainly John Marshall was important in drawing this line.
Perhaps he was even thinking about it when he wrote in Marbury
that there were actions for which the president is "accountable
only to his country in his political character."
But embedded as
these remarks were in a portion of the opinion that was itself
extrajudicial and blatantly political, such language about the
proper role of the Court could have little meaning or credibility. It
was only after and in the wake of Chase's impeachment that
Marshall and others could begin this work in earnest.
II. Marbury and the Power of Juries to Find Law
Professor Nelson's main focus here is on the power of juries to
find law. Federalists with whom Marshall was allied, he says,
deliberately set about to "tame" the civil jury, and as a result of
their efforts juries had lost their lawmaking power by 1804. This
profound change in legal practice was thus produced by a
concerted campaign begun sometime in the mid-to-late 1790s and
successfully completed in less than a decade.
That there was some such campaign is well known.
Historians have long been aware of efforts by elite lawyers to
"professionalize" the law in America.'
Pressure to do so built
61. Id. at 41.
62. Id.
63. Marbury, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) at 166.
64. See ANTON-HERMANN CHROUST, THE RISE OF THE LEGAL PROFESSION
IN AMERICA: THE REVOLUTIONARY AND POST-REVOLUTIONARY ERA (1965);
MAXWELL BLOOMFIELD, AMERICAN LAWYERS IN A CHANGING SOCIETY, 17761876 (1976); GERARD W. GAWALT, THE PROMISE OF POWER: THE LEGAL
PROFESSION IN MASSACHUSETTS, 1760-1840, at 7-35 (1979); Charles R.

McKirdy, The Lawyer as Apprentice: Legal Education in Eighteenth Century
Massachusetts, 28 J. LEGAL EDUC. 124 (1976). Nelson himself has already
been a major contributor to this debate. See NELSON, AMERICANIZATION,
supra note 9.
Two new efforts to expand our knowledge of these
developments-both to be published soon-deserve special mention: John
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gradually throughout the eighteenth century, as the legal
profession grew and expanded its influence.
This pressure
slackened during the Revolution, which wreaked havoc on the
established bar and nurtured a more populist jurisprudence, but
demand for reform reemerged after adoption of the Constitution.
The demand was not strictly a partisan affair, and it was
supported by at least some Republicans who were also members of
the elite bar.6" But, as Nelson suggests, the strongly anti-populist
ideology of Federalism made its adherents far more likely than
Republicans to support measures that reduced the role of laymen.
Bear in mind that this process of professionalization involved
much more than just announcing that judicial instructions were
binding and granting new trials more frequently. Juries may have
been the principal device securing popular control over the
administration of law, but the eighteenth-century jury was
situated within a procedural system and a legal culture whose
every feature helped underscore and reinforce the centrality of lay
control. Nelson's paper hints at this when he mentions efforts to
change such practices as circuit riding, seriatim opinions, and the
publication of official reports. But the point is sufficiently central
to his argument that we should take a moment to lay out more
systematically certain critical features of eighteenth-century legal
practice.
Start with personnel: the number of trained lawyers
increased throughout the eighteenth century,6 but at the time the
Constitution was adopted, untrained or poorly trained lawyers
were still by and large the rule. Bar associations were virtually
non-existent outside New England, and even there the
requirements for admission were minimal and haphazard. 7
Formal legal education was in its infancy, with few law schools
teaching few students and an unregulated system of
apprenticeship providing what little legal training most lawyers
received.'

Reid's study of New Hampshire and Daniel Hulsebosch's discussion of the
Federalists in New York. See John Phillip Reid, Controlling the Law: Legal
Politics in Early National New Hampshire (manuscript on file with author);
Daniel J. Hulsebosch, Constituting Empire: New York and the Transformation
of Constitutionalism in the Atlantic World 376-419 (manuscript on file with
author).
65. GAWALT, supra note 64, at 95-96.
66. Stanley N. Katz, Looking Backward: The Early History of American
Law, 33 U. CHI. L. REV. 867, 869, 874 (1966).
67. See BLOOMFIELD, supra note 64, at 139; LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN, A
HISTORY OF AMERICAN LAW 355 (1973); ALFRED Z. REED, TRAINING FOR THE
PUBLIC PROFESSION OF THE LAW 67-103 (1921).
68. See FRIEDMAN, supra note 67, at 84-85; MCKIRDY, supra note 64, at

124-26; Hoyt P. Canady, Legal Education in Colonial South Carolina, in
SOUTH CAROLINA LEGAL HISTORY 101, 101-04 (Herbert Johnson ed., 1980).
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Judges, too, were not generally trained in the law, and there
was no telling what the "ministers, would-be theologians,
physicians, shoemakers, tailors, and farmers [who] became judges"
might tell a jury.69 The low prestige of being a judge, combined
with nettlesome circuit-riding duties and low salaries, were such
that many of these lay judges ironically turned out to be better
lawyers than the judges who had legal training."
Even apart from issues of personnel, the judiciary was illsuited to exercise significant control over the law. Trials were
presided over by multi-member panels, with each judge required
to instruct the jury separately. 7' Their instructions were not yet
binding, and the frequency with which members of the panel
disagreed-an occurrence made likely by lack of professional
training and a dearth of published precedent-weakened even the
persuasive effect of the court's legal exegesis. Rules of evidence
were more informal and less controlling than today, diminishing
the judges' ability to shape what happened at trial, while the
absence of special pleading left the court few opportunities to take
a case from the jury." Once a jury decided, its judgment was
almost always final, for there were as yet few grounds upon which
to order a new trial and none permitting the court to direct a jury
verdict.
Nor were judges in a position to develop the law even when
appeals could be taken. Many courts had only a single term,
which meant that legal issues had to be decided at the same time
the judges were hearing trials, leaving them little time to consult
or reflect. Worse, because rulings on questions of law had to be
made while the court was riding circuit, the judges were unable to
do research unless they happened to be in a place where someone
owned a legal library.7' It goes without saying that such libraries
were rare. 74
Even had there been time to do research and a library to use,
the judges would have found little to consult. Written opinions
were virtually non-existent. Few judges published their decisions,
and the only available sources of American case law consisted of
handwritten manuscripts, which could be copied but were seldom
widely available; partisan pamphlets; and unreliable newspaper
accounts from a handful of notorious cases.75 The first unofficial

69. ELLIS, supra note 6, at 115; FRIEDMAN, supra note 67, at 124-27.
70. WILLIAM PLUMER, JR., LIFE OF WILLIAM PLUMER 183-84 (1857); see
Reid, supra note 64, at 71-72.
71. See PLUMER, supra note 70, at 236; NELSON, AMERICANIZATION, supra
note 9, at 26; Reid, supra note 64, at 109.
72. See NELSON, AMERICANIZATION, supra note 9, at 21-28.
73. See Reid, supra note 64, at 143-156.
74. FRIEDMAN, supra note 67, at 88-90.
75. See J.M. SOSIN, THE ARISTOCRACY OF THE LONG ROBE 203 (1989).
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reporter did not appear until 1789, when Ephraim Kirby published
a volume of decisions of the high court of Connecticut, followed the
next year by Alexander Dallas in Pennsylvania. 7' As late as 1805,
the appearance of the first volumes of official reports in
Massachusetts and New York was considered so noteworthy an
event that the leading New England journal published reviews
written by the likes of rising star Daniel Webster and New
Hampshire's Chief Justice Jeremiah Smith." Nor were there, as
yet, treatises or systematic digests of American law to which
lawyers and judges could turn in lieu of official reports. There was
only Blackstone, who became important almost by default. But
even Blackstone was of limited utility given prevailing sentiments
against English law and the widespread belief in American
exceptionalism: what was right and good for England simply was
not automatically right or good for America.78
Obviously, not every colony's or state's legal system shared all
these traits. The structure of legal practice differed from place to
place, as did the pace of development. But the overall pattern was
everywhere the same, and it made the jury powerful indeed.
Making no effort to hide his disapproval, one mid-nineteenth
century commentator described how things had looked at the turn
of the century:
The justice of the case was held up as the law of the case; and the
jury were to judge both of the law and the fact. Of course there
could be no uniformity in the decisions. There were no fixed
principles; but each case must have been decided according to the
impulse of the jury, who could have no rule but their own
fluctuating ideas of justice.' 9
Concerned lawyers began pressing for reform in some states
as early as 1791, a movement that spread and escalated in
urgency in the ensuing years." But the reformers were hardly
76. See ELLIS, supra note 6, at 118-19; Alan V. Briceland, Ephraim Kirby:
Pioneer of American Law Reporting, 1789, 16 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 297, 297
(1972); Edward Dumbauld, Legal Records in English and American Courts, 36
THE AM. ARCHIVIST 28-29 (1973).
77. See Reid, supra note 64, at 157-70. Their reviews were published in The
Monthly Anthology and Boston Review. Id. Later, other distinguished
lawyers-including not only Webster, but also Caleb Cushing, Joseph Story,
and Henry Wheaton-reviewed volumes of judicial reports in The North
American Review, the leading monthly journal of its kind. Id.
78. See FRIEDMAN, supra note 67, at 88-89, 98, 146.
79. JOHN H. MORISON, LIFE OF THE HON. JEREMIAH SMITH 174 (1845).
80. For studies of the politics of legal reform in the early republic, see
ELLIS, supra note 6, at 111-229 (Kentucky, Pennsylvania, and Massachusetts);
Reid, supra note 64, at 33-55 (New Hampshire); GAWALT, supra note 64
(Massachusetts); A.G. ROEBER, FAITHFUL MAGISTRATES AND REPUBLICAN
LAWYERS: CREATORS OF VIRGINIA LEGAL CULTURE, 1680-1810, at 160-261
(1981). In addition, G. Edward White touches on some of the broader themes
in introducing the legal culture of the Marshall Court. See G. EDWARD WHITE,
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unopposed, and little they sought to accomplish would come easily.
The nation was, in fact, badly divided on the question of law
reform. On one side were lawyers and businessmen who wanted
to increase predictability in the law, especially in commercial law,
by reducing popular control.
They fought for greater
professionalism on the bench and at the bar, as well as for an
array of other changes designed to make the legal process more
orderly. Opposing them were all those people who continued to
view the legal system as serving "an essentially arbitral function"
in which "[o]rdinary people, applying common sense notions of
right and wrong, could resolve the disputes of life in localized and
informal ways.""1
The confrontation between these groups took place on many
fronts and over many years. In part, the battle was intellectual.
Understanding "the laws and constitution of our own country,"
Blackstone had said, is a "science" --a view that became
increasingly fashionable among professionals in the early
nineteenth century.'
Law was more than a haphazard
aggregation of holdings and statutes, they believed, more than just
common sense and common justice.
Law was a system of
principles: an intelligible, harmonious ordering whose organic
structure and dynamic rules could be understood and taught using
the same methods practiced in other sciences.
For those who embraced it, this view of law as science had
profound implications. It meant that legal outcomes were not
things generated impulsively in and for each new case, but rather
something that could be predicted based on knowledge of the
appropriate principles-principles that could themselves be
organized in a coherent, digestible fashion. Champions of this
view set out to prove their claim, too, producing a steady stream of
treatises, digests, and, specialized texts covering nearly every
aspect of American law.'
But the principles of the law were intricate and complex, not
at all the sort of thing that could be grasped intuitively by the
untrained . Special knowledge and long hours of study were
required. Hence, professionals in the early nineteenth century
THE MARSHALL COURT AND CULTURAL CHANGE, 1815-1835, at 76-156 ( 1988).

81. John H. Langbein, ChancellorKent and the History of Legal Literature,'
93 COLUM. L. REV. 547, 566 (1993).
82. 1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND *3
(Univ. of Chicago ed., 1979) (1765).
83. See WHITE, supra note 80, at 79-83; WILLIAM P. LAPIANA, LOGIC AND
EXPERIENCE: THE ORIGINS OF MODERN LEGAL EDUCATION 29-38 (1994);
GAWALT, supra note 64, at 81-82.
84. See WHITE, supra note 80, at 86-95; LAPIANA, supra note 83, at 40-41;

Hulsebosch, supra note 61, at 394, 397; Daniel J. Hulsebosch, Writs to Rights:
Navigability and the Transformation of the Common Law in the Nineteenth
Century, 23 CARDoO L. REV. 1049, 1061 (2002).
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worked hard to reform legal education: founding new law schools,
changing the curriculum and style of teaching, and lobbying to
make formal schooling a prerequisite to joining the bar. 8 And, of
course, if law really was a complicated science that required
intense study and special training, it could not be left to the
common sense of laymen. Hence, the professionals sought to
replace lay judges, to beef up requirements for admission to the
bar, and to limit the authority and discretion of juries.'
Most of what this legal reform movement targeted for change
were practical aspects of day-to-day administration.87
The
professionals sought to change-and their opponents to preserve
or extend-virtually every feature of the system outlined above.
There were fights over whether to allow a single judge to preside
at trial or, barring that, to allow a single charge to the jury;
whether to continue appointing lay judges or to appoint only
lawyers to the bench; whether to make jury instructions binding
and limit the jury's role to factfinding; whether to institute a
system of special pleading and incorporate other procedures
enabling courts more easily to dispose of cases without submission
to a jury; whether to abolish the common law writ system; whether
to have a separate term for hearing appeals; whether to produce
official reports or at least permit the publication of written
opinions; and whether to hire court reporters.
In the end, the professionals triumphed, though their
progress was slow and uneven and they suffered many setbacks
along the way, especially in the south and west. Nevertheless, by
the 1830s the process of professionalization was far advanced
throughout the nation. The Jacksonians staged what amounted to
a last ditch effort to stave off the triumph of the lawyers, but it
was already too late. They had little choice but to concede control
to the professionals, and they tried instead to make the
professional bench and bar more accountable-mainly through a
movement to codify law and by the enactment in many states of
85. See LAPIANA, supra note 83, at 29-78; R. Kent Newmyer, HarvardLaw
School, New England Culture, and the Antebellum Origins of American
Jurisprudence,74 J. AMER. HIST. 814 (1987).
86. See GAWALT, supra note 64, at 98-99, 105-07; Reid, supra note 64, at
115-30; NELSON, AMERICANIZATION, supra note 9, at 165-74.
87. Unless otherwise indicated, the points in this paragraph and the next
are drawn from ELLIS, supra note 6, at 111-266, who describes the politics of
judicial reform in a number of states; and Reid, supra note 64, passim, who
closely studies one state (New Hampshire). The broad framework suggested
by these authors, particularly Reid, is supported by William Nelson's and
Gerard Gawalt's studies of Massachusetts and by A.G. Roeber's study of
Virginia. See NELSON, AMERICANIZATION, supra note 9; GAWALT, supra note
64; ROEBER, supra note 80. See also WHITE, supra note 80; BLOOMFIELD,
supra note 64, at 33-90; FRIEDMAN, supra note 67. It is unfortunate that we
lack equally intensive studies of other states, though the sporadic evidence
that exists suggests a process that was similar nationally in its essentials.
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provisions for an elective judiciary. But their uphill struggle to
recapture popular control of substantive law by codification never
came close to displacing the common law.' Judicial elections, in
the meantime, may have had both good and bad consequencesthough nothing "so earthshaking... as proponents had hoped and
opponents feared"89 -but they did nothing to weaken the
commitment to a professional bench or to shake the legal
profession's monopoly on judicial posts.'
Placing Nelson's claim in the context of this larger story
suggests two respects in- which his argument may need to be
modified. The first concerns the matter of timing. One simply
cannot say, as he does, that "by 1804 at the latest, the civil jury
had been tamed."9' The most one can say is that an argument for
controlling the jury had been developed by this date, and that a
group of influential judges had begun taking steps to make this
argument a reality. But precisely because lay deliberation was
secured and reinforced by so many other elements of the existing
legal culture, successfully reining in the civil jury required first
achieving various related reforms as well. These included, among
other things, changing the courts (especially the state courts,
which heard the vast majority of cases) by appointing judges who
shared these High Federalist aspirations. It required changing
the bar by increasing the number of lawyers who agreed that
juries should not decide law and generating a sufficient body of
published precedent to make this sort of supervision possible. It
required modifying procedural rules to facilitate judicial
superintendence, especially by reforming rules of evidence and
pleading. Most important, it required enlarging the grounds
available for judges to take a case from the jury. Granting new
trials was a crude and ineffective solution, even after the grounds
had been enlarged, though it had to do for many long years.
Eventually, judges found more effective ways of avoiding or
overturning what they regarded as erroneous jury verdicts, but it
took many more years for them to develop something recognizable
as the power to award a judgment non obstante veredicto.9
88. See BLOOMFIELD, supra note 64, at 84; GAWALT, supra note 64, at 18283; CHARLES M. COOK, THE AMERICAN CODIFICATION MOVEMENT: A STUDY OF
ANTEBELLUM LEGAL REFORM (1981); PERRY MILLER, THE LIFE OF THE MIND

IN AMERICA FROM THE REVOLUTION TO THE CIVIL WAR 239-65 (1965); Robert

W. Gordon, Charles M. Cook's The American Codification Movement: A Study
of Antebellum Legal Reform, 36 VAND. L. REV. 431, 435-36 (1983) (book
review).
89. FRIEDMAN, supra note 67, at 323.
90. See 1 LOUIS BOUDIN, GOVERNMENT BY JUDICIARY 317-405 (1968);
FRIEDMAN, supra note 67, at 323-24, 371-73; JAMES WILLARD HURST, THE
GROWTH OF AMERICAN LAW: THE LAW MAKERS 140 (1950).
91. Nelson, supra note 3, at 327.
92. 9A CHARLES ALLAN WRIGHT & ARTHUR R. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE
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When all is said and done, it is not possible to say precisely
when the civil jury was "tamed." Certainly judges had obtained
control of the law in civil cases in most states by the 1830s. But
whether we can date the change earlier (and, if so, how much
earlier) requires further study. The pace of change was different
in different parts of the country, and judicial control over civil
juries was accomplished earlier in some states than in others. It
was, however, a slow and unsteady process that was still just
beginning in 1804.
That this was so seems clear from Nelson's own evidence,
which includes at least two instances around the time he says the
process was completed in which judicial efforts to deprive juries of
their traditional authority were rather peremptorily rebuffed by
legislation-the Judiciary Act of 1802 at the federal level, and the
New York legislature's response to the 1804 case of People v.
Croswell." It may well be, as Nelson asserts, that this merely
forced the judges to search for different ways to achieve their ends.
My point is merely that they could not do so in an instant and that
it took them considerable time.
A second respect in which Nelson may need to qualify the
argument is his description of causes. Nelson attributes the effort
to strip juries of lawfinding power to two principal sources: the
Revolution, which he says fostered a new sense that citizens spoke
through their elected legislatures, thus undermining any notion of
juries as "the Voice of the People"; and the partisan split of the
1790s, which Nelson argues exacerbated elite discomfort over the
breakdown in deference, thus reinforcing this elite's worries about
the dangers of popular influence. These developments, Nelson
urges, motivated Federalists to seek to reduce popular control over
the law: ergo, their effort to take away the jury's lawfinding
power.
Both of the developments Nelson describes undoubtedly
occurred, but there is little reason to believe that either was
integrally related to what happened to the civil jury. Consider
first the role of the Revolution in changing popular perceptions
about how "the people" spoke. Emphasizing a republican polity's
ability to act through the government definitely put pressure on
some traditional forms of popular expression, especially those
associated with violence by the people out-of-doors. Mob activity
had a long, almost distinguished pedigree in the Atlantic world,
and crowd action had formed a crucial part of America's resistance
to England in the years before Independence.94 Yet as early as
AND PROCEDURE § 2522 (1995).
93. See Nelson, supra note 3, at 327.
94. PAULINE

MAIER,
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(1972);

John

Phillip Reid, In a Defensive Rage: The Uses of the Mob, the Justification in
Law, and the Coming of the American Revolution, 49 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1043
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1784, we find Samuel Adams-arguably the most prominent and
effective mob leader of the Revolutionary era-criticizing the
activities of mobs in western Massachusetts (what would
subsequently become known as Shays's Rebellion) on the ground
that "as we now have constitutional & regular Governments and
all our Men in Authority depend upon the annual & free Elections
of the People, we are safe without them."95
By no means did mobbing. disappear. Even the Shaysites
evoked mixed reactions.'
There was, moreover, plenty of mob
activity in the 1790s and beyond: from the Whiskey Rebellion to
the continued activities of frontier "regulators" to Fries Rebellion,
opposition to the Jay Treaty and Alien and Sedition Acts, and the
Baltimore Riots of 1812. 9'
But for many, Republicans and
Federalists alike, erecting popular governments made this sort of
behavior less acceptable. Whatever may once have been the case,
they said, the proper means by which to express and measure
public opinion had become elections, petitions, and non-violent
forms of political pressure or protest.9
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matter of whether one supported or opposed the mob's cause.
But,
increasingly, even those who shared the discontent of insurrectionists were
troubled by their use of violent extralegal means. A dozen years after Shays's
Rebellion, as Republican leaders conferred about tactics to use against the
Alien and Sedition Acts, Jefferson responded to word of Fries Rebellion in
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Yet while republicanism may have had this effect on some
institutions, I see little reason to count the jury among them.
Nelson's only evidence-a quote from Administrator of Moore v.
Cherry-hardly provides decisive support, and while his
interpretation of the opinion is not implausible, neither is it
obvious or clear.99 I am, moreover, unaware of any instances in
which anyone directly or expressly contested the jury's lawfinding
power as inconsistent with republicanism (as Adams and many
others did, for example, when it came to mobs).
Perhaps this is because the jury had always been
conceptualized as supplementary to an elected and accountable
legislature: a paradigmatically republican institution that
protected the community from courts and judges. Where the
franchise constituted "the Part which the People are by the
Constitution appointed to take, in the passing and Execution of
Laws," John Adams wrote in 1771, juries played a homologous role
in the administration of justice:
As the Constitution requires, that, the popular Branch of the
Legislature, should have an absolute Check so as to put a
peremptory Negative upon every Act of the Government, it requires
that the common People should have as compleat a Controul, as
decisive a Negative, in every Judgment of a Court of Judicature.'°
The importance of the jury as a crucially republican
institution is evident from its centrality in the debates over
ratifying the Constitution. There is no hint anywhere in the
deliberations that adopting a republican constitution called in any
way for rethinking or changing the traditional role of juries as
finders of both fact and law. On the contrary, the mere possibility
that the proposed charter failed strictly to preserve the right
became one of the Anti-Federalists' most effective arguments
against ratification."' Federalists responded by conceding the role

designing may produce insurrection," he worried in a letter to Edmund
Pendleton. "Nothing could be so fatal":
Anything like force would check the progress of the public opinion & rally
them round the government. This is not the kind of opposition the
American people will permit. But keep away all show of force, and they
will bear down the evil propensities of the government, by the
constitutional means of election & petition.
Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Edmund Pendleton (Feb. 14, 1799), in 7 THE
WRITINGS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON; supra note 24, at 356.
99. See Nelson, supra note 3, at 320.
100. John Adams, Diary Notes on the Right of Juries (Feb. 12, 1771), in 1
LEGAL PAPERS OF JOHN ADAMS 228-29 (L. Kinvin Wroth & Hiller B. Zobel
eds., 1965).
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and importance of the civil jury in a republican government, and
they bent over backwards to assure the public that "[t]he friends
and adversaries of the plan of the convention, if they agree in
nothing else, concur at least in the value they set upon the trial by
jury," while hastening to comfort skeptics that the right "will be in
no degree altered or influenced by the adoption of the plan under
consideration."" ° Federalists explained the Constitution's failure
expressly to protect the civil jury on the ground that practice
varied from state to state, which they said made it unwise to
impose a uniform national rule-a point they subsequently yielded
in the Seventh Amendment." 3
It is, I suppose, possible that people came to see the
traditional jury as inconsistent with republican government soon
after the Constitution was ratified-though, again, it seems
remarkable, if this was true, that no one bothered to say so. There
are, moreover, still other reasons to doubt Nelson's claim that civil
juries lost the power to find law because "the people" now spoke
through their republican legislatures.
To begin with, only a very small portion of litigation involved
statutes. The overwhelming majority of cases were still based on
common law-a fact that remained unchanged for at least another
century. That being so, it seems unlikely that protecting the
legislature's work-product from arbitrary jury verdicts could have
been a major concern motivating this profound change in the jury's
role. In fact, what judges were mainly trying to do by limiting the
power of juries was to seize control of the common law. Yet no one
argued, or could plausibly have argued, that judicial
interpretations of common law reflected the voice of a republican
people better than a jury. The argument, rather, was that
common law embodied a highly developed organic system that
only the legally trained could master and hope to understand. The
argument was, in other words, profoundly anti-democratic, which
is why Republicans resisted it and why Jacksonians sought to
defeat it by codification and judicial elections.
More telling still, the concern Nelson highlights about
properly identifying who speaks with "the voice of the people"
would have been no less applicable to the criminal jury than to the
civil one. Indeed, anxiety about the need to prevent runaway
juries from "interpos[ing] their 'private opinion' in the path of
legislation reflecting the public's will""° would presumably have
been more compelling in the context of criminal cases given the
special role of criminal law as an expression of community will.
Yet, as Nelson's own evidence makes clear, only the power of the
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civil jury changed in this period. The criminal jury retained its
control over the law as well as the facts until at least the late
nineteenth century. 0 5 Writing in 1832, for example, Benjamin
Oliver observed in his middle-of-the-road treatise on the "Rights of
an American Citizen" that "if, after hearing the prisoner's
argument, and the charge of the court, the jury should be clearly of
opinion, that the law is according to the argument, and the judge's
06
1
charge is wrong, it will be their duty to acquit the prisoner."
The second cause identified by Nelson-Federalist worries
about partisan conflict and a breakdown in deference-appears at
first blush to be more closely related to changes in jury practice,
though I believe that it, too, ultimately had little direct effect. As
Nelson observes, the 1790s were not at all what Federalists had
anticipated when the Constitution was adopted. Most Federalists
expected amicably to govern a quiescent population content to
follow their wise leadership. Instead, they found themselves
wrestling with an unruly democracy-in-the-making. 7 Suddenly
everyone apparently felt entitled to express an opinion-more felt
that "constituted authorities" should be listening to what they had
to say. Sharp fault lines opened as people divided on incendiary
issues like Hamilton's financial program or whether to side with
England or France in the European wars. Federalist leaders were
caught flat-footed, unsure how to cope with this confusing new
world in which, as James Kent put it, "powerful rivalries prevail in
the Community; and Parties become highly disciplined and
hostile."' °8
Alarmed Federalists watched in dismay as the opposition
threat grew with each passing year. Jefferson's supporters seemed
to capture state after state, also taking possession of the House of
Representatives and threatening, eventually, to control the Senate
and maybe even the presidency as well. No one had expected this.
Certainly not at the federal level, where size and complexity were
supposed to ensure harmonious rule by (in the words of former ally
105. Sparfv. United States, 156 U.S. 51, 110-83 (1895) (Gray, J., dissenting);
Mark DeWolfe Howe, Juries as Judges of Criminal Law, 52 HARV.L. REV. 582
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James Madison) "representatives whose enlightened views and
virtuous sentiments render them superior to local prejudices and
to schemes of injustice."'1°
As these expectations collapsed amidst the growing partisan
acrimony, some Federalists found themselves thinking about a
new role for courts. An argument for judicial review had first
developed in the 1780s, but it was significantly more restrained
than what we think of as judicial review today. There was no
notion that judges were more responsible for interpreting the
Constitution than any other branch of government, nor a principle
that the interpretations of any of the branches were final or
authoritative. Government officials were the regulated, not the
Their
regulators, when it came to the Constitution.
interpretations were subject to direct supervision and oversight
from the people themselves. ' Judicial review, on this view, was
required by the judges' independent obligation to obey the people,
but it had the additional advantage of enabling courts to assist the
community by rendering popular resistance unnecessary when a
constitutional violation by one of the other branches was "beyond
dispute."'1
Political developments in the 1790s led Federalists to rethink
these ideas. Although fear of tyrannical majorities had always
been a critical part of Federalist ideology, it had not previously
been emphasized in connection with judicial review. Some earlier
writers had referred in passing to problems of faction while
discussing the courts' role in enforcing the Constitution. But these
references were brief, because earlier backers of judicial review
were thinking mostly about legislative mistakes or efforts by
legislators to aggrandize their own power at the people's
expense."' Now, suddenly, things looked different, and Federalists
developed a heightened appreciation for the potential usefulness of
courts in securing constitutional limits from the threat posed by a
partisan majority-as if the federal judiciary had been deliberately
constructed with this purpose in mind. It was the courts, Kent
wrote in 1794, because they are "organized with peculiar
advantages to exempt them from the baneful influence of Faction,
[that were] the most proper power in the Government to...
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maintain the Authority of the Constitution."113 Within a few short
years, this had become the orthodox position of High Federalism.
Rather than seeing judicial review mainly as a device to protect
the people from their governors, Federalists came to view it above
all as a means of guarding the Constitution from the people. Thus
was born the modern idea ofjudicial supremacy.
At first expressed only in pamphlets or by politicians, by the
late 1790s some Federalist judges had begun voicing the new
constitutional theory from the bench. Given the nature and
structure of the legal system, moreover, the practical application of
this theory first arose in connection with controlling juries. Hence,
as Nelson points out, certain Federalist judges acted in
prosecutions under the Sedition Act to deny juries any opportunity
to pass on the law's constitutionality. They did so by refusing to
permit defendants to argue such matters to the jury and by
instructing jurors that "[t]he Judicial power ... [is] the only proper
and competent authority to decide whether any Law made by
Congress; or any of the State Legislatures is contrary to or in
Violation of the federal Constitution.""'
For several reasons, however, we must be careful not to
overstate the significance of such cases for what Nelson has
described as the "taming" of the civil jury. First, these precocious
judicial gestures toward the courts' supremacy were sporadic,
highly localized, and obviously wrapped up in Federalist anxieties
over America's quasi-war with France. Fear that the French
Revolution was about to reach American shores unbalanced many
normally sensible politicians in the late 1790s, and it was
apparently also enough to induce some otherwise level-headed
judges to espouse what, at the time, was still an extreme position.
Efforts made to take constitutional questions from the jury at this
particular moment, in other words, reflected Federalist
skittishness as much as some sort of determined judicial
commitment-which is why they occurred only in cases involving
the Sedition Act or other war-related matters, and why even
judges who took this position did not adhere to it consistently. In
less politically charged cases, some of the same judges continued to
recognize the jury's traditional discretion respecting constitutional
decision making. Nelson quotes Justice Paterson, for example,
telling jurors in Matthew Lyons's case that they had no authority
over constitutional questions. 15 Yet, as he also acknowledges, just
three days earlier, Paterson charged the jury in another case-this
113. Kent, supra note 108, at 942.
114. Samuel Chase's Charge to the Grand Jury of the Circuit Court for the
District of Pennsylvania (April 12, 1800), in 3 THE DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF
THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES, 1789-1800, at 408, 412 (Maeva
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one challenging a statutory land confiscation-that "if legislatures
assumed to themselves the power to enact unconstitutional laws
they ought not to be binding upon juries; and... courts and juries
116
were the proper bodies to decide on the constitutionality of laws."
More important, the Sedition Act cases are not so much about
the respective roles of judges and juries generally as they are
about their roles in deciding questions of constitutionality in
particular. This is because, in context, the issue was framed not
by the need to control the jury, but rather by the need to control
the Constitution. Chase and Paterson were claiming exclusive
authority for judges (and no one else) to declare an act of
legislation void on grounds of inconsistency with the Constitution.
Their argument for locating this authority in courts-the
argument outlined by Kent in his "Introductory Lectures"-turned
on considerations uniquely applicable to constitutional law. It
encompassed juries only because and insofar as they too claimed
authority to interpret the Constitution, but Congress, the
executive, and the states were equally targets of the argument.
Hence, Chase and Paterson were acting to limit the jury in
criminal prosecutions for seditious libel, whereas the reform
described by Nelson dealt with limiting the power of civil juries
and was not generally extended to criminal cases. This is clear
from Chase's opinion in James Callender's case, which conceded
that juries have "a right... to determine what the law is in the
case before them" while drawing a line at the "very different thing"
involved in "determin[ing]
that the statute produced is no law,"
117
viz, is unconstitutional.
We should also note that Chase's and Paterson's argument
was decisively rejected at the time. It was rejected in the sense,
noted above, that the criminal jury retained its control over law for
many decades to come. But it was also rejected in the broader
sense that the election of 1800 (together with the subsequent
repeal of the Judiciary Act of 1801 and the midterm election of
1802) amounted to an overwhelming political repudiation of
judicial supremacy and a resounding reaffirmation of popular
constitutionalism, of which the jury was an essential part.'
This
is why John Marshall's 1803 opinion in Marbury contained no talk
about how courts alone could interpret the Constitution and said
only that "courts, as well as other departments" were authorized to
do so.1 9
It is, indeed, striking how carefully and deliberately
Marshall avoided saying anything that might smack of unpopular
Federalist ideas, writing an opinion that closely tracked the
116. See 3 DHSC, supra note 114, at 236 n.24 (quoting the AURORA (Phila.
Nov. 9, 1798)).
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Jeffersonian line on the scope and justification of judicial review.
None of which is to suggest that factors like those Nelson
points to were wholly irrelevant as regards the movement to rein
in the civil jury. But their role was more indirect and attenuated
than he suggests. They were background influences: part of a
broader, more complex tapestry of forces that (usually unselfconsciously) tugged people in different directions and helped shade
their responses to events. For some, already sensitive to the
hazards of popular control, developments like a perceived
breakdown in deference undoubtedly reinforced their sense of a
need to act. But for the reasons described above, I doubt such
changes had any greater or more direct influence than this.
So what was the immediate motivation for taking from civil
juries the power to find law? As just suggested, no one influence
can be said to have "caused" this change. The factors that made it
possible to deprive juries of this traditional power were myriad
and overlapping, as this was but a small part of more sweeping
changes that gradually overtook the legal system in the early
decades of the nineteenth century. Still, if any single factor
predominated in bringing this particular change about-at least in
the eyes of those who pushed for reform-it seems to have been a
growing appreciation of the need to have predictable rules in civil
cases.
This is a point Nelson himself made in his earlier book The
Americanization of the Common Law.12' It is, moreover, the
argument emphasized by his sources here. Hence, Nelson quotes
Theodore Sedgwick (and others) talking about the need for judges
to control the law so as to provide litigants with "expedition" and
"certainty" as opposed to "the fluctuating estimates of juries." 1 '
The reasons for this concern were straightforward. Economic
development in the Early Republic had fueled changes in the
expected role of law and legal services. "Law now had to serve
business interests," John Reid tells us. "Agreements had to be
enforced to carry out the wills of the parties, not the morality of
the community.""' Demand for legal rules that could reliably be
known beforehand-something the eighteenth-century's jurydominated system was manifestly incapable of providing-grew
increasingly insistent. 2 ' Nelson quotes James Kent complaining
about the absence of published opinions, which was indeed a major
concern in this regard. But the capriciousness of unregulated
juries was of greater concern still. "Decisions formed at one term
120. NELSON, AMERICANIZATION, supra note 9, at 165-74.
121. Nelson, supra note 3, at 332 (quoting Sedgwick from ELLIS, supra note
6, at 190; Cogswell v. Essex Mill Corp., 23 Mass. (6 Pick.) 94, 96 (1827)
(argument of counsel)).
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were not only no precedent for cases precisely similar at the next
term," complained a Portsmouth correspondent, "but not even for
those occurring the next day, nor perhaps even the next hour."124
The problem was obvious to businessmen and politicians alike: "If
similar questions are to be determined differently in different
cases, then no counsel can advise his clients with confidence." 12' It
was this intensely practical concern that seems to have been at the
forefront of the movement to limit the power of civil juries.
III. THE BEST LAID PLANS
In the concluding section of his paper, Professor Nelson
speculates briefly about how judicial review and jury control might
have been linked in Federalist ideology and in "the larger
configuration of John Marshall's jurisprudence." 26 As Nelson
explains it, the problem of governing in eighteenth-century
America required finding a balance between two potentially
conflicting principles. One was what we would today call the
principle of democracy; that is, the idea that "all law springs from
popular will."'27 The other was the belief that law must conform to
fundamental and unchanging principles of right and justice. In
Federalist ideology, it was the task of the aristocracy-an elite of
well-born and wealthy gentlemen-to ensure that this balance was
Before the Revolution, equilibrium was
properly preserved.
maintained through deference by ordinary citizens. Democratic
juries might have unbridled power to declare the law, but this
power was unthreatening so long as jurors deferred to instructions
from elite judges about what law to declare. And, Nelson says,
"[m]ost of the time, it appears that democratic juries did, in fact,
pay heed and give deference to the fixed principles of law of which
the judges informed them." 28
Things changed after the Constitution was ratified. New
issues arose: national issues, in which the stakes were higher and
the harm from local interference greater. Worse, deference itself
began rapidly to break down, as democratic forces unleashed by
the Revolution took their toll on the social structure of colonial
America. Juries started going their own way: giving free rein to
local passions and prejudices, and ignoring instructions and law
A new balance was needed, and (Nelson
more frequently.
hypothesizes) Federalists led by John Marshall were there to
construct it. Since the country could no longer trust juries that
had become capricious, elite judges had to act more aggressively
124.
1813,
125.
126.
127.
128.

A Friend to Justice, On the JudicialAct, PORTSMOUTH ORACLE, July 17,
at p. 2, col. 1.
CHARLES H. BELL, THE BENCH AND BAR OF NEW HAMPSHIRE 37 (1894).
Nelson, supra note 3,at 341.
Id. at 343.
Id. at (49).

The John MarshallLaw Review

[37:357

themselves to protect vested rights and fundamental principles of
law. Hence, they took lawfinding power away from juries and
sought to secure control over the Constitution through judicial
review. Their object was not to destroy or undermine democracy,
however. On the contrary, Nelson says, Marshall "understood and
was in sympathy with the workings of American democracy. " "'
Rather than squelch it, Marshall sought only to rechannel popular
energy from the jury to the legislature:
[Jiudicially administered common law became a default norm that
civil juries could not surmount. Certainty and stability thus were
preserved, and elites routinely remained in a position to guide the
direction of society. But the people could change law through
politics if they organized and made the necessary effort to change it,
and the narrow doctrine of judicial review proclaimed in Marbury v.
Madison gave judges virtually no power to resist once the people
had made up their minds. Something akin to the balance of the
eighteenth century thus was restored. 130
Several premises of this argument seem questionable.
Nelson's account of eighteenth-century juries obediently following
the instructions of gentlemen judges, for example, is at odds with
his own account of colonial juries in Massachusetts, as well as
with what we know generally of the judiciary in pre-Revolutionary
America.1 3 '
The power of eighteenth-century juries, as noted
above, rested partly on the fact that judges were not lawyers and
often were not especially wealthy, and partly on the frequency
with which multi-judge panels offered conflicting accounts of the
law." 2 More important, while Nelson is certainly correct that
Marbury's theory of judicial review was narrow, Marshall adopted
this theory only reluctantly and against his better judgment. Like
most Federalists in 1803, Marshall favored a stronger version of
judicial authority-one that did, indeed, resemble the modern
system in claiming for the Court final and ultimate say over the
Constitution. He was forced to articulate a narrower theory in
Marbury because to do otherwise was to invite certain retaliation
from the Republican president and Congress. 13 ' But Marshall
never gave up his hopes for establishing judicial supremacy, which
he tried subsequently to institute in McCulloch v. Maryland, and
which he defended in anonymous newspaper essays supporting
that decision.3
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The point is not just that Nelson's effort to construct a story
that ties these developments together has flaws. It is that any
such story is inevitably too pat. It may be less neat and elegant to
say that Marbury and the establishment of judicial review had
little to do with rolling back the civil jury's lawfinding power, that
these were, essentially, unrelated developments.
But, then,
history is seldom neat or elegant. The fact is that Marbury's
narrow theory of judicial review emerged in the mid-1780s and
long predated any moves against the jury. Beginning in the mid1790s, Federalists revised their understanding of judicial review
and tried to convert it from a device that protected the people from
their legislatures to a device that protected the Constitution from
the people. But this understanding, which Marshall shared, was
decisively rejected in the political battles that ended with
Jefferson's election. Rather than being part and parcel of a
coherent Federalist plan to restore some lost balance between law
and democracy, Marbury's theory of judicial review was, from the
perspective of Federalism, a defeat and a concession to the
Republicans. One could, I suppose, put aside the actual beliefs of
those who lived through these events, urging that, whatever they
themselves may have thought, the resulting system miraculously
worked to restore a proper balance. But such claims, in my view,
are just a bit too whiggish to be persuasive.

v. MARYLAND 208 (1969).

